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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
_MARCELLUS K. SNOW, 
... Plaint-iff 
vs, ~ ALVIN KEDDINGTON, County. 
Clerk of Salt Lake County, 
Defendent 
Plaintiff's Brief 
This action seeks an interpretation of the effects of the 
amendment of Section 10 of .A.rticle VIII of the State Consti-
tution, which took effect January 1, 1947; and the validity and 
effect of a part of the legislative act passed March 13, 1947 
amending Section 19-13-6 U. C. A. 1943. In brief, the State 
constitution, from its adoption in 1895 to January 1, 1947, 
provided in Section 10 of Article VII, as follows: 
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"A county attorney shall be elected by the qualified 
voters of each county who shall hold his office for a term 
of two years." 
Pursuant to said constitutional provtston the legislature 
provided in the Revised Statutes of 1898 Sections 541 and 545, 
that among the county officers was a county attorney who should 
be elected biennially at the general election, and hold office for 
a term of two years. These statutes were continued in effect 
until 1947, appearing as Sections 19-13-2 and 19-13-6 U. C. A. 
1943. The legislature, in 1945, proposed to amend Section 10 
or Article VII of the constitution to read that a county attorney 
should be elected ((for a term of four years." Such proposed 
amendment was submitted to voters at the general election in 
November 1946. It carried, and by its express terms became 
effective as a part of the constitution January 1, 1947. In the 
fall of 1946, Edward M. Morrissey, filed a declaration of can-
didacy for nomination as county attorney· of Salt Lake county, 
was no~i~ated for such office and was elected to such office at 
the general election in November, 1946, the same election at 
which the people voted on the above mentioned amendment to 
the constitution. He assumed the office of county attorney pur-
suant to law on January 6, 1947. The legislature on March 13, 
1947, passed an act amending Section 19-13-6 U. C. A. 1943, to 
read: 
ccThe county attorney shall be elected at the General 
Election held in November 1950, and etJery four years 
thereafter. Incumbent County attorneys shall hold office 
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5 
until successors are elected and qualified at the General 
Elections inN o·z'enlber 1950'' 
The further essential facts are that at the time Edward 
M. Morrissey was elected county attorney, the constitution and 
statutes both fixed the term of office at two years, such term, 
by express provisions of law beginning at noon, January 6, 1947 
and ending at noon, January 3, 1949. 
The plaintiff in this action, believing and contending that 
the office of county attorney is therefore open to election this 
fall, tendered and sought to file with the defendant a declara-
tion of candidacy for the office of County Attorney of Salt Lake 
County, as required by law to become a candidate for election 
to that office at the general election in November 1948. De-
fendant, taking the view that the amendment to the constitution, 
and the statutory amendment, both set out above, continued the 
present incumbent in office two years after expiration of the 
term for which he was elected, refused to accept the declaration 
of candidacy and file the same. To determine the questions 
thus presented, this action was filed. 
The solution or answers to. these questions is found within 
the following legal propositions: 
1. The length or term of an office is fixed by- the law in 
effect at the time of election. 
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2. Public policy requires that the term of office be fixed 
before election. 
3. The constitutional amendment does not change the 
existing term of office. 
4. · The legislative enactment attempting to continue in-
cumbents in office by by-passing the 1948 general election is 
void. 
We explore them in order. 
1. THE ESTABLISHED RULE OF LAW IS THAT 
THE TERM OF OFFICE IS FIXED BY THE LAW IN EF-
FECT AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION. 
To hold otherwise is to destroy the elective character of 
public offices. The following cases definitely establish this 
rule of law: 
Wingate vs. Flynn, 249 N. Y. S. 351, 139 Misc. 779, 
affirmed 250 N. Y. S. 917, 177 N. E. 195. 
Board of Elections vs. State Ex Rel Schneide.tr, 128 Ohio St. 
273, 191 N. E. 115,97 A. L. R. 1417. 
If the elective character of public offices are to be pre-
served we must apply the provisions of the constitution which 
were in effect at the time the election was held. It is generally 
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accepted that the same rules which govern the construction and 
interpretation of statutes and written instruments generally 
apply to and control in the interpretations of written consti-
tutions. People vs. Fletcher, 50 N. Y. 288; Wingate vs. Flynn, 
supra. 
Constitutional provisions, like statutes, act prospectively 
and never retrospectively. 12 Corpus Juris 721; McGrew vs. 
Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 Pac. (2nd) 608; Win-
gate vs. Flynn, supra. This principle is forcibly stated in Win-
gate vs. Flynn in 249 N.Y. S. at page 355 where the court held: 
Hit is one of the canons of construct~on, applicable as well to 
constitutions as to statutes, that provisions prescribing power or 
giving authority are to be construed, in the absence of clear 
intention to the contrary, as conferring P?wer or authority 
to be exercised in respect to the future, and not as to transactions 
already consummated." Supporting the statement, the Win-
gate case cites People. Ex rel. Eldred vs. Palmer, 154 N. Y. 
133, 139 N. E. 1084, 1085, from which they quote the law, as 
generally accepted by the courts, as the leading authority on 
the question: (CAs stated in People Ex rel Eldred vs. Palmer, 
it would be contrary to all precedent that the voters should not 
be advised, before casting their votes, of the duration of the 
term of officers to be elected.'' 
This clear statement of the law is followed by: ccPublic 
policy requires that the term of office of an elective officer shall 
be fixed before the election. People Ex rei. Fowler vs. Bull, 
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N.Y. 57, 7 Am. Rep. 302." 
In the instant case up to and including election day and 
six weeks thereafter, both the constitution and the statutes fixed 
the term of the county attorney at two years. At the time 
electors cast their ballots, the constitution and statutes limited· 
the county attorney to a tv1o year tern1 of office. By law, there-
fore, the county attorney elected November 6, 1946, was elected 
for a term of office of two years and no more. To hold other-
wise is to interfere with the right of the people to choose their 
elective officers. This right is basic and must be preserved. 
The physical act of casting a ballot means nothing, but the 
expression of the public will involved in that ballot means 
everything; and such expression must not be defeated, directly 
or indirectly. Courts should never construe·or permit constitu-
tional amendments to be so applied as to deprive the people of 
the right to select their officers by ballot. To do so is to destroy 
our present form of government. The question has been dis-
cussed by the co~rts of the nation on several occasions. In 
People Ex rel. Davis vs. Gardner, 45 N. Y. 812, affirming 59 
Barb-. 198, and quoted as excellent authority in Wingate vs. 
·Flynn, supra, the defendant had been elected county judge at 
the general election held in November. The term of office as 
then fixed by the constitution was four years. At the same 
general election, the amended judiciary article of the constitu-
tion was ratified by the people fixing the term of this office at 
six years. The amendment took effect January 1, 1870, at which 
time the defendant also assumed office for another term pur-
suant to his election in November 1869. The court, in passing 
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upon the duration of the defendant's term of office, decided 
that the defendant held the office until the expiration of four 
years from the 31st day of December, 1869. In People Ex rei. 
Clark vs. Norton, 59 Barb. 169, the defend~nt was elected 
county judge at the general election in November 1869 and on 
January 1, 1870 took office. The same amendment referred to 
in People Ex. rei Davis vs. Gardner became effective January 1, 
1870. The general term held: ttThat the defendant had been 
elected for the term of four years AND THAT THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION IN EFFECT AT THE 
TIME OF THE ELECTION DETERMINED THE LENGTH 
OF THE DEFENDANT'S TERM RATHER THAN THOSE 
WHICH WENT INTO EFFECT SIMULTANEOUSLY 
WITH DEFENDANT'S ASSUMING OFFICE. 
On the date of Edward M. Morrissey's election, the voters 
of Salt Lake County were by constitutional provision to choose 
a county attorney for a term of two years. This term began 
January 6, 1947 and ends January 3, 1949. On January 1, 1947, 
for the first time, the constitution authorized the election by the 
voters of a county attorney for the term of four years. Prior 
to that date there was no authority for anyone to name a county 
attorney for a longer period than two years,· and the constitu-
tional amendment provided that the voters (tshall elect a county 
attorney for a term of four years." It delegated no authority 
to the legislature to designate a county attorney for two years, 
four years, or any other period of time. He is to be elected by 
the people. Any vacancy in the office is to be filled by the 
County Commission. The amendment 'specifically states that 
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it is to. take effect January 1, 1947, and therefore speaks only 
of elections held on or after that date. The wording is positive 
and definite, and not susceptible of more than one interpre-
tation. 
2. PUBLIC POLICY REQUIR~S THAT THE TERM 
OF OFFICE BE FIXED BEFORE ELECTION. 
The words of the constitution, at the time of the election 
of Morrissey, were: t(A county attorney shall be elected ... 
. and shall hold his office for a term of two years." The clear 
import of this language is that the county attorney is to be 
chosen by the electors for a period of two years, and not for 
a period to be subsequently defined by the legislature. As said 
by the New York Court in People Ex rel. Eldred vs. Palmer, 
154 New York 133, 47 N. E. 1084, 5, ((It would be contrary 
to all precedent that the electors should not be advised, before 
casting their votes, _of the durati9n of the term of the officers 
to be elected. The power attempte_d to be exercised by the 
legislature in this case, if sustained, v;ould open the door to 
obvious abuses. It would practically confer upon the legislature 
the power to prescribe a long or short term, and lengthen or 
shorten the official life of an officer, who, by the constitution, 
is to be elected by the people, upon consideration wholly foreign 
to their true inter~sts." In People vs. Bull, 46 N.Y. 57, 7 Am. 
Rep. 302, the court earlier considered this question and declared 
that if the term were not required to be :fixed before election, 
the legislature, by its fiat, and without the concurrence of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
electors, could protect an incumbent in the possession of an 
office for a term for which he had never been elected. Cer-
tainly it is not a rational point to say that the people just elected 
a man to an office for a term to be thereafter fixed by the 
legislature, and subject to the changes of politics, social, eco-
nomic, racial or religious convictions. It is a basic rule· of con-
struction and application of constitutions and statutes, of public 
policy, that unless the power is expressly given, power and 
authority is to be exercised in respect to the future, and not 
as to transactions already consummated or rights or privileges 
already granted. We turn again to the case of Peop_le vs. 
Palmer, supra, and quote: nit :fixes the term at the only period 
which with certainty was included with the intention of the 
electors, and prevents any hiatus in the incumbency of county 
offices. It enforces the public policy that the term of o If ice of 
an elected officer shall be. fixed before the election. (Italics 
added.) It renders fixed and stable the terms· of office, and 
prevents an exercise of legislative power in legislating an in-
cumbent in or out of office upon partisan considerations." This 
view is most consistent with ,the principles of our elective sys-
tem, and the uniform policy upon which the courts have acted. 
}J..s far as we have been able to find all jurisdictions adhere to 
this as the rule of public policy. In People vs. Foley, N. Y. 
App., 43 N. E. 171, 73, the court recognized and declared this · 
the public policy vv-hen it said: nit may, of course, enlarge the 
official term of town officers, but such action can operate only 
upon officers thereafter elected. Where the office is to be 
filled by one authority and the duration of the term is to be 
determined by another, the declaration of such duration must 
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go before the :filliQ.g, so that each authority may have its legiti-
mate exercise. People vs. Crooks, 53 N. Y. 648; People vs. 
McKinney, 52 N. Y. 374; People vs. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57." 
It is common knowledge that the Declaration of Independ-
ence is a declaration of principles and politi~s which are im-
portant in ol\r concep~ of government. Even the charges against 
King George are criticisms for denial of such principles. 
Among them is the right of the people to choose their officers 
-those who govern them. When the constitution w~s written 
it sought to encorporate a government founded upon the prin-
ciples underlying the Declaration. The rights of the people 
to choose their officers ·and to vote, the right to a republican 
form of government, was zealously guarded. 
As said by Justice Stephenson of Ohio in Board of Elections 
vs. State Ex rel. Schneider, 128 0. St. 273, 191 N. E. 115, 97 
A. L. R. 1417: 
((A republican form of government can only be preserved 
by securing to its electors the right to select their governors by 
ballot, for terms fixed in advance by the le,gislature [or consti-
tution] of the state." Again on Page 1426 of the A. L. R.' we 
read: 
(CW e think the idea of our constitution is that the people 
shaJl choose a man to fit the established term, and not that 
the legislature shall estab~ish a term to fit the n1an who 
has been chosen." 
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It seems to be plainly provided by our constitution that 
elections shall be provided so that before the current term of 
elective officers expires, the people may select the incumbent for 
the succeeding term. 
The Montana court in State vs. Levitz, ____ Mont. ____ , 146 
Pac. 932, declared that the general policy of our government 
. . . is that elections to office by the people, when it may be 
conveniently done, is the general rule, and that public officials 
should only obtain office otherwise when necessary to meet 
the requirements of public business until the people rna y act. 
In the words of the Gettysburg Address, this should be a gov-
ernment ttof the people, by the people, and for the people." 
And in Wingate, Surrogate, vs. Flynn, 249 N. Y. S. 351, 139 
Misc. 779; aff. 250 N. Y. S. 917; 223 App. Div. 789, 177 N. E. 
195, 25.6 N.Y. 690, on page 355 of 249 N.Y. S. the court, after 
quoting from the case of People vs. Palmer, supra, says: ((Public 
policy requires that the term of an elective officer shall be fixed 
before the election.'' 
We submit that on the grounds of public policy it must 
be held that the term of Mr. Morrissey as county attorney ex-
pires January 3, 1949; and that the office of County Attorney 
of Salt Lake County is a public elective office to be voted on-
at the general election in November, 1948, and the writ of 
mandate should issue. 
3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT DOES 
NOT CHANGE THE EXISTING TERM OF OFFICE. 
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It ·acts only on future elections and future terms of office. 
It is not retroactive nor retrospective. Since it does not affect 
the existing term it cannot be held to authorize the legislature 
so to do. 
McGrew vs. Indus. Com., 96 Ut. 191, 85 Pac (2nd) 608. 
Dodkins vs. Reece, ____ Tex ____ , 17 S. W. (2nd) 81, 2, 34. 
Board of Elections vs. Ohio, 128 Ohio St. 273, 191 N. E. 
115, 97 A. L. R. 1417. 
We see no room for doubt that the amendment had and 
has no effect on the term of office of an incumbent who was 
elected before the amendment became effective. But should 
it be contended that the amendment could be construed so as 
to affect the existing term, we have explored the authorities as 
to such .. possible construction. 
\Vhere duration or term of office is questioned, duration 
must be confined to the shortest term. 
It is well settled that where the duration or term of office 
is a question of doubt or. uncertainty, the interpretation should 
be followed which limits the office to the shortest term. Wright 
vs. Adams, 45 Tex. 134; Dobkins vs. Reece, 17 S. W. (2nd) 81; 
Chamski vs. Cowan, 288 Mich. 238, 284 N. W. 711, 22 R. C.L. 
550; 43 Am. Jur. Paragraph 154. People Ex rel. Palmer, supra; 
Lowrie vs. Brenan, 283 Mich. 63, 276 N. W. 900. 
In the case of Dobkins vs. Reece, supra, the court quotes 
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with approval the Wright vs. Adams case, supra, as follows: 
Hit is believed, moreover, to be a sound rule of construc-
tion, which holds that when the duration or term of office, 
which is filled by popular election, is a question of doubt or 
uncertainty; that the interpretation is to be followed which 
limits it to the shortest time, and returns to the people at 
the earliest period the power and authority to refill it." 
Turning to Article VIII, Section 10 of our constitution 
which 'vas in effect at the time Edward M. Morrissey 'vas 
elected, '"e read: 
"A County Attorney shall be elected by the qualified 
voters of each county who shall hold his office for· a term 
of two years." (Italics added.) 
The constitution thus created the office of county attorney 
and limited the term of the county attorney to two years. Cer-
tainly, he cannot be elected for two terms at the same election, 
a fortiori. Does the amendmen~ automatically act upon the 
existing term and extend it two years? It does not so provide. 
Can it be construed to do so. The question if worthy of con-
sideration requires the appiication of ~oregoing rule of law that 
of two possible modes of construing the constitution that one 
should be followed which fixes the tenn to the shortest period. 
Since there is a possible contention that the constitution is 
silent as to the effect of the amendment extending the term of 
office of the County Attorney to four years, as far as the Noven1-
ber 6, 1946 election incumben~ is concerned, and if weight is 
given this contention, then the court should apply the general 
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rule that ~COther considerations being equal that construction 
of a doubtful provision of a statute or a constitution will be 
followed, which limits the term of office to the shortest time." 
Thoop' s Public Officers, section 308, Mechem's Public Offices 
and Officers, Sec. 390. State Ex. rel. Birrell vs. Speak, 124 O~io 
St. 636, 180 N. E. 264. 
It must be conceded that the constitution provides that 
the county attorney shall be elected for a definite term. There 
is no provision defining or specifying any immediate effect of 
this amendment. (IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO ALL 
PRECEDENT THAT THE ELECTORS SHOULD NOT BE 
ADVISED, BEFORE CASTING THEIR VOTES, OF THE 
DURATION OF THE TERM OF OFFICERS TO BE 
ELECTED.) State Ex rel. Birrell vs. Speak, supra, People Ex 
rei. Eldred vs. Palmer, supra. The constitution not having 
specifically spoken on what effect the amendment was to have 
on the term of office of the candidate elected prior to its effect-
ive date, by implication under the law provided that the mini-
mum, or two year, period should be taken as the duration of 
the term. To be consistent with the sound principles of the 
elective system and in keeping with the uniform policy upon 
which the courts have acted in de~ling with analogous condi-
tions, we are required to so hold. 
4. THE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT (THE 1947 
AMENDMENT TO SECTION 19-13-6 U. C. A. 1943) IN 
SO FAR AS IT ATTEMPTS TO CONTINUE INCUMBENTS 
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IN OFFICE BY BY-PASSING THE 1948 GENERAL ELEC-
TION IS VOID: 
(a) Because tl_le term was fixed by the constitution. In 
the first point discussed in this brief we have shown that a term 
of office is controlled by the constitutional or statutory pro-
visions in force at the time of election, ·and that both consti-
tution and statute fixed the term of county attorney at two years 
from January 6, 1947. In addition to the authorities therein 
cited, we call the attention of the court to a further array of 
reasons and authorities to show the legislative effort to extend 
the term of office to be invalid. If the constitution fixes the 
duration of a term, the legislature may not change the term of 
office, either to lengthen or shorten -it. 46 C. J. 967. Pinkston 
vs. Watkins, 186 Ky. 365, 216 S. W. 852, held such to be the 
rule even though a constitutional provision authorized the legis-
lature to fix the time when one elected to office should enter 
on his duties. So too when a constitutional provision is enacted 
as to an office, the legislature cannot, by adopting a statute pur-
porting to give effect to the constitutional. provision, alter the 
term. State vs. Young, 139 La. 102, 68 S. 241. And even when 
th~ constitution authorizes the legislature to fix the term, it 
contemplates the exercise of such authority prior to an eiection. 
People vs. Palmer, 154 N.Y. 133, 47 N. E. 1084, 85; 46 C. J. 
967; Allison vs. Massey, 108 Okla. 140, 235 Pac. 192. 
A very illumiqating case is State vs. Plasters, 74 Neb. 652, 
105 N. W. 1092, 3 L. R.A. (N.S.) 887, 13 Ann. Cas. 154. 
That was a case somewhat similar to ours where the legislature 
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enacted a law to dispense with annual elections and hold general 
elections only every two years. Such was within the legislative 
power. But the legislature instead of providing that at the 
next annual election, the officers should be elected for a two 
yeat term, and biennially thereafter, provided that many officers 
whose terms expired that fall should hold over until the fall 
of the succeeding year when elections would be for two year 
terms. Practically the situation here. The Nebraska court 
in a well-reasoned and documented opinion voided the act. 
The court said: ((The legislature has declared that (A' who is 
now holding office, and whose term for which the people 
elected him will expire in January next, shall hold that office 
for another year. That is nothing else than providing by legis-
lative enactment who shall be register of deeds in the respective 
counties from January 1906 to January 1907. This we think 
the legislature cannot do." Following this case in 13 Ann. Cas.-
' is a NOTE which covers this subject well. It states the rule 
that even if the legislature has power to create the office, it 
cannot by an act passed for .that purpose extend the term for 
which the incumbent was elected. Matter of Haase, 88 App. 
Div. (N.Y.) 242, 85 N.Y. S. 462, aff. 41 Misc. 114, 82 N.Y. S. 
982; People vs. McKinney, 52 N.Y. 374; People vs. Foley, 148 
N. Y. 677, 43 N. E.171; People vs. Randall, 151 N. Y. 497, 
45 N. E. 841; Matter of Burger, 21 Misc. 370, 47 N.Y. S. 292; 
State vs. Trewhitt, 173 Tenn. 561, 82 So. 480; State vs. Kres, 
88 Wis. 135, 59 N. W. 593. 
People vs. McKinney, 52 N. Y. 374, overruled People vs. 
Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128, which had held the legislature could 
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extend the term of a town officer. 
Where the constitution provides a limit for the term of an 
office, the legislature cannot extend the term of the incumbent. 
State vs. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 589, 9 N. E. 849; Deweese vs. 
State, 10 Ind. 343; State vs. Harvey, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 227, 8 
Ohio Cir. Court 599. 
In Sipe vs. People, 26 Colo. 127, 56 Pac. 571, it appears 
that after election of a city treasurer in 1897, who under the 
statute in effect at the time of his election would have held office 
for a term of one year, th.e governor approved an act of the 
legislature passed before the- election, v1hich made the term of 
the city treasurer two years. The court held that an election 
could not be held in 98 because the election law for it had been 
repealed and under the constitution the incumbent conti11:ued 
in office only because of the provision for holding over until 
election of a successor. In Gammer vs. State, 163 Ind. 150, 71 
N. E. 478, 66 L. R. A. 82, it seems the term of office of County 
Treasurer as fixed by the constitution was two years. The 
legislature passed an act providing that as to officers whose 
term did not begin until January 1, 1903, no successors should 
be elected until 1906. This act was defended upon the theory 
that it merely fixed the time of commencement of the term. 
The ccurt rejected the contention, saying that the pov1er to 
fix commencement of terms was not intended to confer upon 
. the legislature the power to postpone unnecessarily the election 
of a successor to an office and thereby create a condition en-
abling an incumbent to hold office after the expiration of his 
tenn. 
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An enlightning case early referred to in this case calls for 
further note here. Board of Elections vs. Ex Re Schneider 
Ohio, 1,28 Ohio St 273, 191 NE 115, 97 ALR 1417, involved 
county recorders under facts almost identical with those in 
this case. The court in an elaborate opinion voided the ((term 
extending" part of the statute. 
(b) The legislature was not authorized to prescribe the 
term of the county attorney. The people have spoken, and by 
the constitution established the office and fixed the term thereof, 
the legislature was powerless to legislate with respect thereto. 
Such is the law laid down in People vs. Bull 46 NY 57, 7 Am. 
Rtp 302, and the cases cited under topic (a) supra. 
(c) We concede the right of the legislature to enact laws 
setting up machinery for the election of county attorneys, and 
to make the term conform to the constitutional amendment. 
There is authority for the claim that within the term fixed 
by the constitution, the legislature may fix the date of the 
beginning and the end of the term. But all those cases hold 
such acts must be done before the election, and cannot affect 
any officer or his term of office for which election was held 
before the legislature spoke. Alilson vs. Massey 108 Okla 140, 
235 Pac 192; Treadwell vs. Colo Co. 62 Cal 140, 235 Pac 192, 
People vs. Palmer 154 NY 133, 47 NE 1084. 46 CJ 967. 
We think it clear that as far as the statutory act involved, 
attempts to continue in office without election this year the 
incumbent county attorneys, the sanie is null and void. 
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We desire however as an aid to the court to call attention 
to a rule recognized by some courts, and to aid the court in an 
analysis of those cases, and their application of the rule they 
discuss. We refer to the sometimes stated rule that the legisla-
ture, to harmonize terms or elections of county officers, or to 
unify or eliminate elections when they become so numerous 
as to burden the public, rna y make changes in election laws, 
or change the beginning or ending date of a term, within con-
stitutional li.tnitations, even though it may have the effect of 
continuing an incumbent in office after ~e expiration of the 
term for which he was elected. We have no arguments with 
such statement nor the reasons upon which it is founded. But 
this case does not come within that rule as justified or applied 
by any of the decisions we have been able to find. 
In the first place, the statutory enactment skipping the 1948 
election and extending the two year term of the incumbent to 
four years was not made to harmonize or unify the tenns of 
county officers. The statutes as th~y existed prior to 1947, and_ 
as they now exist provide that the election of county officers 
occurs every two years; some at one geenral election; and the 
election of other county officers occur . in the next general 
election. Whether the county attorney runs with one group in 
elections or \Vith the other group in the alternate elections he 
still runs in a year when there is a general election, at which 
other county officers are being elected. It has always been and 
still is the practice that two members of the County Con11nission 
and the county attorney are elected in the one election, while 
in the alternate election the county officers whose duties are 
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mostly ministerial are elected. Since the county attorney is 
the legal advisor and director of the county, his county duties 
are essentially tied up with, and an important part of the policy 
of making of the county. It seems most fitting, and consistent 
with our form of county government that he should then be 
elected at the same election as only the policy making part of 
the county government is elected; that the policy making body 
may more likely be harmonious, and approach its problems 
from familiarity with the public will on the issues that de-
termined the election. 
In the second place the act under attack did not unify, 
simplify, or eliminate any election. It is still necessary to hold 
its general election every even numbered year in the county 
for election of county officers. 
Again the rule has never been recognized or applied where 
it would extend the incumbency beyond the first succeeding 
general election. Hutchinson vs. Pitts, 170 Ark. 245, 278 S. W. 
639. The cases are reviewed and the rule stated in Russell vs. 
State, 171 Ind. 62.3, 631, 87 N. E. 13, from which we quote: 
none of two things must necessarily result; either that 
the Legislature might postpone the commencement of a 
term to such a term to such a time the commencement of 
a term would be abridged by the election of a successor, 
or the commencement of the term to be postponed beyond 
/ every second election to such a time as that the expiration 
of the term, unabridged, would pass a general election, and 
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thus such a condition arises as that successive Legislatures 
could pass every second election, and a portion of the 
t~e the office be filled by the action of the Legislature, 
or by appointment, and not by the voters; for example, 
if appellant's theory is right, that his term began January 
1, 1905 and terminated January 1, 1909, when appellee's 
term would have begun, and extended to January 1913, 
then '"hat is to prevent the Legislature in 1911 from post-
poning the commencement of the term of appellee's suc-
cessor to January, 1914 expiring in 1918, thus passing the 
general election of 1914, and so on, each alternate term? 
It will thus he seen that it would put it in _the power of 
the Legislature to ignore every second election, and fill 
the office a good portion of the time, though an election 
_would intervene every alternate four years, at which an 
auditor might be elected. 
ult then resolves itself jnto the question whether the . 
Legislature is empowered under the Constitution to fix 
the time of commencement of the term of office of a county 
auditor when that result will be to postpone the expira-
tion· of the term beyond one or more general elections, 
and does it 'postpone unnecessarily the election of a suc-
cessor to the office, and thereby create a cond~tion author-
izing the incumbency to hold over after expiration of his 
term'? 
"Wheth~r the voters ar~ entitled to fill an office at any 
election depends upo_n the question as to whether the tern1 
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of an officer will expire, so that but for such election a 
vacancy will occur by limitation which is another way of 
stating the proposition that they are entitled to elect at 
the election next preceeding the expiration of the term. 
It is conceded by the appellant that Lang's term expired 
March 28, 1904: It must follow that appellant's term 
began with the expiration of his term, or we would not 
have the anomaly presented by the example put by us by 
which the Legislature could fill the office, or invoke ap-
pointive power, instead of the elective a good part of the 
time. 
ccThe distinction between the cases cited by appellant 
-Scott v. State, 151 Ind. 567, 52 N. E. 163; Weaver v. 
the State, 152 Ind. 479, 53 N. E. 450; Aikman vs. State, 
152 Ind. 567, 53 N. E. 836; State ex rel. McMullen vs. 
Harris, 152 Ind. 699, 52 N. E. 168 - and the case here 
presented is marked. In none of those cases did the fact 
of the postponement of the commencement of the term 
postpone its expiration, so that its expiration would be 
beyond the holding of a general election next preceding 
the expiration of the term." (Italics added.) 
The court in State vs. Galusha, 74 Neb 188, 104 N. W. 
197; and in Hensley vs. Plasters, 74 Neb. 652, 105 N. W. 1092, 
3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 887, 3 Ann. Cas. 154, cited supra, review 
the authorities and show they all hold to the same effect. See 
also 46 C. J. 967. An annotation beginning on page 1437 to 
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144~ of 97 A. L. R. makes an extensive review of the cases. 
We commend it to the court. 
We recapitulate: 
1. The term of office is fixed by the law in effect at the 
time of election. 
2. A person elected, is elected to the office, and for the 
term of office fixed by the constitution and statutes at 
time of election, and not for any other term. 
3. Public policy requires that the term of office be fixed 
before election. 
4. The constitutional amendment did not change the 
existing term of office of the county attorney. 
5. The legislature was not authorized to prescribe or fix 
or change the term of office of the county attorney. 
6. Any legislative rights to change term of office or tenure 
therein by changing date of beginning or ending of 
tenure must be exercised before election. 
7. The legislative enactment here involved was not made 
to harmonize terms of county officers; to unify or 
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eliminate or simplify elections; it unreasonably pro-
longs the tenure in office of incumbents, and by carry-
ing them over beyond the next general election amounts 
to a legislative appointment, and destroys the elective 
character of the office. 
We respectfully submit that the term of office of the in-
cumbent county attorney of Salt Lake County expires January 3, 
1949; that the office of county attorney is a public elective office 
to which the, incumbent after January 3, 1949, should be chosen 
by the electors at the general election in November, 1948; and 
that the Writ of Mandate prayed for in this action should issue. 
MARTIN M. LARSON 
MARK S. MINER 
CLARENCE C, NESLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
605 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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